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Abstract
Family resemblance describes the covarying information across members of a category.
In an attempt to demonstrate human categorization based on family resemblance—
that is, on the style of a category, it seems that categorical definition must be made an
incidental part of the task so that participants employ a strategy described by Brooks
(1978) as “nonanalytic cognition”. Eigenvectors obtained from the dimension reduc-
tion of pixel-maps describe the underlying structural variation across a set of images.
Partially reconstructed images made from a subset of their derived eigenvectors were
used as stimuli in investigating judgements of style, as they appear to be without
human-nameable features. The following exploratory experiments provide evidence
for spontaneous judgements based on family resemblance using as little information
as is contained in the first 10 eigenvectors of Monet and Picasso paintings.
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Chapter 1
Pigeons’ Judgements of Complex Categories
Herrnstein and Loveland (1964) successfully trained pigeons to discriminate between
photographs that contained people from those that did not.1 Many of the people
in the photographs were partially obscured by objects, such as vehicles, trees, and
window frames. They were located in different areas throughout the photographs:
at the centre or off to the side, at the top or the bottom, close up or far off in
the distance. Some photographs contained one person, and others contained various
sizes of groups. The appearances of the people themselves varied considerably: they
were dressed, semi-nude, and nude; male and female; adults and children; standing,
sitting up, and lying down; of European, African, or Asian descent. The attributes of
the photographs themselves also varied considerably in lighting, colouration, tinting,
and season. The photographs of people varied so considerably that there wasn’t any
apparent consistent characteristic of the images that unified them all, except for the
fact that they depicted something about people. These photographs demonstrate a
class of visual stimuli so complex that it defies simple description.
The pigeons were able to learn to discriminate photographs containing “people”
from those that were “non-people” quite easily, even when the experiment was redone
with black and white photos and when the images were out-of-focus. Herrnstein and
Loveland (1964) also found the nature of the errors that the pigeons made to be quite
interesting. The pigeons sometimes failed at the discrimination task when the people
in the photographs were largely obscured, and they occasionally responded to photos
that contained objects relating to people, such as vehicles. Although both of these
1Although the two types of images in Herrnstein and Loveland (1964) are being referred to as
“people” and “non-people”, these terms refer only to discriminating photographs containing people
from those that do not; there was no claim that the pigeons were discriminating people directly.
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types of errors decreased as training continued, some errors that the pigeons made
were beyond any known explanation.
What is less clear is how the pigeons succeeded. Herrnstein and Loveland (1964)
interpreted the pigeons’ ability as well as their ease with accomplishing the task
as evidence for the pigeons using a pre-existing concept of “people” to discriminate
between the photographs. They thought that performing the task allowed the pigeons
to make use of an innate concept of “people”, and they concluded that these animals
have greater powers of conceptualization than what is normally attributed to them.
Such an interpretation was particularly compelling, given that the pigeons—once they
had been trained—were able to generalize their discriminating ability to never-before-
seen photographs. Herrnstein and Loveland (1964) compared the pigeons’ learning of
the discrimination with their being taught to peck for access to a feeder; the capacity
to do so is innate, and training need only be done to teach the animal to map the
pre-existing concept in order to receive the rewards of the task.
In a similar vein, Watanabe, Sakamoto, and Wakita (1995) trained pigeons to
judge between paintings by Monet and paintings by Picasso. There are many possible
cues for such a judgement, but there is unlikely to be a single feature that consis-
tently differentiates one artist’s work from the other’s. The paintings presented to
the pigeons were displayed in grey-scale, left-right reversed, and out of focus, but the
pigeons’ success at the task persisted. Not only could the pigeons successfully gener-
alise to never-before-seen paintings by Monet and Picasso, but also they were able to
judge other Impressionist and Cubist painters, such as Braque and Cezanne. These
results have been replicated with paintings by Van Gogh and Chagall (Watanabe,
2001).
These experiments contained such complex categorical structure that there is un-
likely to be any simple way to define the photographs containing people (Herrnstein
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& Loveland, 1964) or paintings by particular artists (Watanabe et al., 1995). The
question, then, is how pigeons are able to perform the task correctly; that is, what is it
(if anything) that persisted throughout alterations to the photographs and paintings
that made it still possible?
In subsequent research, Herrnstein, Loveland, and Cable (1976) trained pigeons
to discriminate images that contained trees, bodies of water, and even specific people
from those that did not. The ability to perform such a difficult task appears to
pose two problems. First is the analysis of the individual features that enable a
participant to determine whether a particular object is a member of a certain class.
The other is the analysis of properties of classes that allow them to be discriminable.
The traditional explanation describes the common elements that persist across the
members of a class. According to such a theory, trees, for example, have something
specific that is common to all of them, such as a particular shape or texture (or a
combination).
Having carefully looked at the hundreds of images they used for their discrimina-
tion tasks, however, Herrnstein et al. (1976) could not even begin a list of common
elements. To recognize a tree, for instance, it is not necessary for it to be green. Nor
does it have to be leafy, vertical, woody, branching, etc. Further, in order to decide
that something is not a tree, that object need not be void of green, leaves, wood, etc.
Neither were they able to identify common elements in the experiments involving
bodies of water and specific people.
An alternative to common elements is offered: what we see and describe as trees
actually make up a complex list of probabilistic co-variations. In a tree, for example,
the green should be on the leaves if either one is present. The branching parts should
also be woody (rather than anything else), and so forth. The complete listing of all of
the probabilistic co-variations that make objects “trees” would then be so long and
3
complex that the learning of individual items in the list would be an unlikely feat.
Rather, categorical inclusion is determined by “family resemblance” (e.g., Wittgen-
stein, 1953; Ryle, 1951; Brooks, 1978; Brooks, Squire-Graydon, & Wood, 2007; Medin
& Schaffer, 1978; Rosch, 1975).
1.1 Family Resemblance
People have no trouble in their everyday lives making categorical judgements. Under
most circumstances, one would not confuse, say, a cat and a dog. The task even seems
trivially easy; however, the visual information that falls on the retina is remarkably
similar for the two animals. Not only that, but we are able to correctly apply the
labels of “cat” and “dog” to myriad stimuli without difficulty. Animals as distinct
from one another as a husky and a teacup poodle both fall under the same label of
“dog”. One might attempt to generate a rule that includes all breeds of dogs and
excludes all breeds of cats, but the task is not easy; a typical rule might be something
like, “dogs bark and wag their tails, and cats meow”. However, no one would confuse
a dog for a cat if it never barked or had its tail fully docked. Furthermore, the
category of “dog” is not so strictly defined in itself; a rescued pet with a missing limb
would still easily be considered a “dog”. Our explanations for the categorization of
stimuli eventually come to an end somewhere.
To be fair, there do exist specific rules in the world of zoology that determine
what species a particular organism is a member of. However, we certainly do not
run through such a set of rules in our daily lives in order to decide that something
is a dog (or, for that matter, a person, a Monet, or a Picasso). Indeed, our decision
that something is a dog is instantaneous. We don’t use an explicit rule that defines a
dog relative to another animal, such as cat. Rather, membership to these categories
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is based on family resemblance. Say, for example, that Picasso’s Ma Jolie looks
like Guernica. Guernica, in turn, looks like Old Guitarist. Old Guitarist, then,
looks like Garc¸on a` la pipe. Although Ma Jolie bears no resemblance to Garc¸on
a` la pipe, the members of the Picasso “family” may be thought of as lying along a
continuum according to their degree of similarity to one another. As there are multiple
characteristics of each member to be considered, the continuum describing degrees
of similarity spans out in multiple directions. Aside from looking for a signature,
there seems to be no simple rule that determines the inclusion of these paintings into
the one category of “Picasso”; instead, the resemblance of their polymorphous traits
creates the basis for indirect categorisation.
1.2 Judgements of Style
Beyond establishing categorical boundaries, the concept of family resemblance sug-
gests that individuals become sensitive to the structural regularities in stimuli through
incidental, everyday exposure to examples of categories. People then develop sensi-
tivities to structural regularities such that our judgements of stimuli can be described
as the identification of style. That is, for example, we consider a new painting at the
gallery to have been painted by an Impressionist because we see a stimulus with an
overall style of “Impressionism” (whatever that may be).
It is important to note, however, that Herrnstein et al.’s (1976) example demon-
strates the idea of family resemblance using human-nameable features. That is, traits
such as verticality or greenness are linguistic labels unique to humans. In doing so,
they admit the following:
Having looked at the hundreds of instances used here or even at the two
positive instances [shown in a Figure in the original paper] (let alone the
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tens of thousands involved in real-life discriminations), we cannot begin
to draw up a list of common elements. To recognize a tree, the pigeons
did not require that it be green, leafy, vertical, woody, branching, and so
on (overlooking the problem of common elements nested within terms like
leafy, vertical, woody, and so on). Moreover, to be recognizable as a non-
tree, a picture did not have to omit greenness, woodiness, branchiness,
verticality, and so on. Neither could we identify common elements in the
other two experiments. (pp. 297-298).
Clearly, even those positing family resemblance are uncertain as to its correctness.
A slight alternative is proffered here. It may be that family resemblance describes an
overall gestalt co-variation rather than a co-variation of nameable features. It seems
necessary to generate stimuli that are absent of any human-nameable features in order
to test for human participants’ judgement ability based on this gestalt covariation.
The techniques of dimension reduction described in Chapter 2 will serve to do just
that.
Another possibility is that there is some sort of simple consistency across images
that has yet to be noticed. It could be, for example, that all images containing trees
(or people, or bodies of water, etc.) are also lighter in one particular corner, or are all
darker in another. To account for such a possibility, eigen-decomposition is necessary.
Our initial inability to detect such a simple regularity does not prove that one does
not exist.
The capacity to make indirect categorical judgements based on style would explain
the wide assortment of rather sophisticated-looking discrimination tasks that pigeons
can perform (Herrnstein & Loveland, 1964; Siegel & Honig, 1970; Poole & Lander,
1971; Malott & Siddall, 1972; Morgan, Fitch, Holman, & Lea, 1976; Herrnstein et al.,
1976; Cerella, 1979, 1980; Herrnstein, 1979; Herrnstein & de Villiers, 1980; Blough,
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1982, 1985; Bhatt, Wasserman, Reynolds, & Knauss, 1988; Jitsumori & Yoshihara,
1997; Aust & Huber, 2001; Watanabe, 1993). The experiments that follow are ex-
ploratory. They are attempts to investigate under what, if any, circumstances human
participants may make judgements based on the overall style of paintings as visual
stimuli.
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Chapter 2
Generating Stimuli with Dimension Reduction for
the Investigation of Judgements of Style
Given the human capacity to use language as a tool to describe specific object detail
(this point will be discussed more later on), it seems it is imperative to generate
stimuli with structure that is not easily articulated (i.e., without human-nameable
features), and as well to capture any covariance across the members of a family.
Dimension reduction reduces the number of variables in high-dimensional data in
order to make the remaining information more tractable. Many common statistical
dimension reduction techniques such as principal components analysis (PCA) and
singular value decomposition (SVD) use this strategy (Jolliffe, 1986; Stevens, 1996;
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).
For the purposes of the following experiments, statistical dimension reduction has
been used to compile a large set of Monet and Picasso painting images (including the
images used by Watanabe et al., 1995) that were constructed with reduced dimen-
sionality. 160 images of Monet paintings and 160 images of Picasso paintings were
brought to the standard size of 320 x 240 pixels by expanding or cropping, as needed.
The shortest axis for every image was adjusted to either 320 or 240 pixels (depending
on which axis), and was then centred and cropped. Thus, each painting was repre-
sented as a cropped computer image composed of 240 × 320 × 3 (Red-Green-Blue) =
230,400 pixels. The vectors of the images were assembled into a matrix that was then
decomposed into its orthogonal dimensions (i.e., the eigenvectors) that described the
underlying structural covariation across the set of images. Each of the images was
then partially reconstructed using a weighted, linear combination of some of its eigen-
vectors (e.g., Devijver & Kittler, 1982; Hancock, Bruce, & Burton, 1998; Valentin,
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Abdi, Edelman, & O’Toole, 1997), and coded as to whether it was a Monet or a Pi-
casso image. See Figures 2.1 and 2.2 for examples of full and partially reconstructed
images.
2.1 Classifying the Images With a Neural Network
A linear autoassociative neural network is built from simple units that are linked by
weighted interconnections. It is a classifier that learns based on prior exposure to stim-
uli; that is, it adapts. During the process of learning, the weighted interconnections
are modified in order to maximise the neural network’s capacity of classification. The
network itself, then, may be considered as an artificial memory, as the content gained
from exposure to stimuli is stored and disseminated across the interconnections. As
a result of exposure to different stimuli, the neural network develops the capacity to
recognise stimuli. It can also generalise its knowledge to never-before-seen stimuli
(e.g., Abdi, Valentin, & Edelman, 1999; Dayhoff, 1990). Given the distributed nature
of its learning capacity, a neural network might serve as an appropriate simulation
for learning based on family resemblance.
This memory—the 230,400 pixels × 230,400 pixels weight matrix, W, relating the
connection value between each pixel and every other pixel over the 320 images—can
be computed via the SVD of the 230,400 pixels × 320 matrix, X, of the images. The
SVD of a rectangular matrix, X, is expressed as X = U∆VT, for which U is the
matrix of eigenvectors of XXT, V is the matrix of eigenvectors of XTX, and ∆ is
the diagonal matrix of singular values—the square-root of the eigenvalues of either
XXT or XTX (as they are the same).1 In statistics, the related eigendecomposition
of the data matrix is called principal components analysis (PCA), and so such linear
1XT denotes the transposition of matrix X.
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autoassociators are often referred to as PCA neural networks (see Abdi et al., 1999).
From this perspective, W can be represented in terms of the eigenvectors, U, of the
pixels × pixels cross-products matrix (see Abdi et al., 1999):
W = δUUT
where δ corresponds to the eigenvalues. The effect of Widrow-Hoff learning is to
spherise the weight matrix, i.e., render all of the resultant eigenvectors equally im-
portant in reconstructing the stimuli (Abdi et al., 1999), yielding:
W = UUT
Retrieval of an item from this memory, xˆi, is computed as
xˆi = Wxi (2.1)
= Ul:m(U
T
l:mxi) (2.2)
where the subscript, l:m, denotes the range of eigenvectors used to reconstruct the
item. For our purposes, the eigenvectors are ordered in terms of the magnitude of the
associated eigenvalues (i.e., proportion of variance accounted for), from most to least.
As only the eigenvectors with associated eigenvalues greater than zero are retained,
there are at most as many eigenvectors as there are items in the training set. The
expression in parentheses of Equation 2.2 can be interpreted as the projection, pi|l:m,
of the item into the space defined by the eigenvectors,
pi|l:m = UTl:mxi
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where the values of pi|l:m are the weights on each eigenvector used to reconstruct the
item from the linear combination of eigenvectors:
xˆi = Ul:mpi|l:m
Thus, given the eigenvectors of the set as a whole, each item can be represented in
a very reduced form as its projection weights on the eigenvectors. It is in this sense
that the eigenvectors can be seen as the “macrofeatures” of the items, as the visual
images differ along the dimensions that the eigenvectors encode for (see, e.g., Abdi,
Valentin, Edelman, & O’Toole, 1995; Turk & Pentland, 1991, for similar analyses of
photographs of faces).2
The learning of the labels (Monet/Picasso) associated with the images was sim-
ulated by training a simple classifier, a variant of a perceptron known as an “ada-
line” (see, e.g., Dayhoff, 1990). The adaline is a simple linear heteroassociator with
Widrow-Hoff error-correction, composed of a multiple-unit input layer and one binary
output unit. In statistical terms, it is a simple linear discriminant function analysis
of the inputs to predict the binary classification of the items (see, e.g., Abdi et al.,
1995).The inputs to the classifier were the projection weights on the eigenvectors for
each item to produce a final set of discriminative weights to predict the artist cate-
gory, in the form of a simple linear equation, from the projection weights for any given
input item. This approach is equivalent to fitting a hyper-plane to the projections of
the items that best (in the sense of the least-squares criterion) separates the Monet
images from the Picasso images.
2Using the leave-one-out technique (e.g., Abdi et al., 1995), each image was projected into the
space defined by all the remaining 319 images. The cosine similarity of each projected image com-
pared with itself was determined. The cosine similarity is indicative of how representative the image
is of that space. In the subsequent experiments to be reported, the cosine similarity was used to se-
lect the “best” Monet and Picasso images (i.e., those that are best representatives of their respective
spaces).
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2.1.1 Results
The classification responses for different ranges of eigenvectors (i.e., representing the
use of more and more of the “macrofeatures” of higher dimensionality) of the Monet
and Picasso images were scored as hits and false-positives (for the respective positive
category it had been trained with), and then converted to a non-parametric, signal-
detection measure of discrimination, A′. Values of A′ vary between 0.00 and 1.00,
and approximate the results of a two-alternative forced-choice (2AFC) task with the
same discriminative stimuli; a value of A′ = 0.50 indicates “chance” discrimination;
values of A′ greater than 0.50 indicate increasingly successful levels of discrimination
(see, e.g., Wickens, 2001). This discrimination index was computed for classification
based on just the first “macrofeature” or eigenvector, the first 2, the first 3, . . . , 10,
15, 20, 25, 30,. . . 95, 100, 150, 200, 250, 300, and all 319 eigenvectors.
The results are shown in Figure 2.3. Clearly, substantial levels of discrimination
between the Monet and Picasso images is possible with this approach. Discrimination
increased as more eigenvectors were used to make the discrimination, although the
effect appeared to asymptote once the first 8 or so eigenvectors were included.
2.1.2 The Perceptron Applied Directly to the Pixel
Maps
As mentioned in Chapter 1, it is possible, for example, that the Monet paintings are
generally darker than Picasso ones, or contain more blue, etc., and hence, may be
discriminated directly in terms of these mean differences rather than the covariant
differences in the pixel values themselves. To assess this issue directly, the perceptron
classifier was applied directly to the pixel-maps of the images to predict their classi-
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fication. Shown as well in Figure 2.3 as a dashed line, mean training discrimination
(A′) of the Monet from the Picasso images when the perceptron classifier is applied
directly to the pixel maps is 0.64—far lower in terms of performance than with items
that have undergone eigen-decomposition.
2.2 The Importance of Early Eigenvectors
Every eigenvector has an associated eigenvalue that indicates the degree of variance
throughout the whole image set that the corresponding eigenvector accounts for; a
larger eigenvalue denotes a larger degree of variance. An image varies along the most
salient dimensions that so-called “early” eigenvectors account for. Smaller eigenval-
ues correspond to “late” eigenvectors, and they represent less salient dimensions of
variation.
The early eigenvectors encode for key categorical information; for example, male
and female faces have a strong tendency to be oppositely weighted on the second
eigenvector (Abdi et al., 1995). The primary dimensions of a stimulus depend on the
images that the eigenvectors are extracted from; the first eigenvector is essentially
the prototype of all of the images (Devijver & Kittler, 1982). Therefore, the second
eigenvector is actually the first one to depict any variation between the images. Eigen-
vectors only encode for visually-relevant information; semantic labels—like gender or
age—have no relevance. Given such information, it is impressive that an explicit se-
mantic category would spontaneously emerge. Another important point is that some
eigenvectors—because the model is free to extract whatever information it deems use-
ful for the discrimination of specific images—will encode for visual information that
typically possesses no corresponding semantic label (Turk & Pentland, 1991).
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2.3 Generality
The concepts of dimension reduction and neural network modeling are not limited
to visual stimuli; for example, a linear associator can successfully learn to discrimi-
nate music composed by Bach from music composed by Mozart (Crump, 2002). A
dimension reduction mechanism can also be successfully applied to language. SVD
applied to written text constitutes latent semantic analysis (LSA). Extremely large
bodies of text may be reduced into a subset of dimensions of variation. Words are
then considered to be nodes in a multidimensional semantic space; words with similar
semantic meaning are closer together in the space (Landauer & Dumais, 1997).
LSA offers a possible solution to Plato’s “poverty of the stimulus” problem, as its
learning process is extremely inductive, and could provide insight into how children
acquire language at a rate that is exponentially greater than what would be expected,
given how much could ever be taught directly. The majority of information needed
in order for LSA to identify a word on a vocabulary test is based on where the word
does not occur. Therefore, it could be that the majority of information contained
within language relates to word choice, rather than word order (Landauer, 2002).
It is also possible that dimension reduction may be able to help explain how indi-
viduals acquire other forms of knowledge; applying LSA to introductory psychology
textbooks and testing it using the same multiple-choice exam administered to under-
graduate students yields a grade of 60 percent—only slightly below the class average.
Although not conclusive, it is possible that LSA demonstrates the same mechanism
that individuals use when acquiring some types of information. Evidence for such a
claim is supported by the fact that the LSA and human participants tend to make the
same types of errors; for example, conceptual questions were answered less accurately
than factual ones (Landauer, Foltz, & Laham, 1998).
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2.4 Physiological and Evolutionary Evidence for
Dimension Reduction
The term “natural scene” refers to any image that an individual could possibly en-
counter as a visual stimulus (so, despite the misleading name, man-made objects such
as buildings can occur in natural scenes). Natural scenes merely occupy a small frac-
tion of all possible scenes (Attneave, 1954; Ruderman, 1994). Therefore, all of the
images that an individual could encounter in a lifetime are only a minuscule portion of
all possible images. When images are considered simply as arrays of pixels, a random
image is composed entirely of random pixels; that is, there is no relationship between
a pixel and any of the ones adjacent to it. When random images are generated, they
appear as white noise (Ruderman, 1994). The pixels in a natural image, however,
are correlated with one another, as they typically share a common form; that is, for
example, pixels in an image of a sky would have correlated properties, as they are
collectively an image of the same object. Such a correlation gives rise to a structure
in natural images that does not occur in random images (Atick & Redlich, 1992).
The visual system has had exclusive exposure to natural stimuli throughout his-
tory. It would, therefore, be the only environment in which the visual system evolved
in. The visual system could possibly have adapted to make use of the structure present
in natural visual stimuli (Barlow, 1961, 2001; Marr, 1982). Dimension reduction is
based on these structural regularities, and therefore appears to be consistent with the
evolutionary history of the visual system (Hancock, Baddeley, & Smith, 1992).
By applying dimension reduction techniques to images of natural scenes, re-
searchers have found remarkable consistencies in the emerging dimensions; the ex-
tracted eigenvectors of natural images are very similar, regardless of the size, number,
or quality of the images (Baddeley & Hancock, 1991; Hancock et al., 1992; Heide-
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mann, 2006). The results provide evidence for a possible innate consistency in the
structure of natural images. The visual system might make use of core consisten-
cies, and dimension reduction demonstrates an efficient method for extracting them.
Therefore, because natural images vary along the eigenvectors, specifically encoding
these dimensions is a logical method for analysing visual stimuli.
There are many characteristics of dimension reduction and of the resulting eigen-
vectors that seem analogous to physiological structures in the visual system; for ex-
ample, the first few early eigenvectors are depicted as an oriented bar (Baddeley
& Hancock, 1991; Hancock et al., 1992; Heidemann, 2006), and may correspond to
“bar” and “edge” detectors in the primary visual cortex (Hubel & Wiesel, 1959).
Another parallel occurs when dimension reduction is applied to coloured natural im-
ages; early eigenvectors appear that consistently code for red-green, yellow-blue, and
black-white dimensions (Buchsbaum & Gottschalk, 1983; Rubner & Schulten, 1990;
Usui, Nakauchi, & Miyake, 1994). This specific colour encoding corresponds to the
colour-opponent processes (Valois, Abramov, & Jacobs, 1966).
2.5 Non-Human Animals
Given the preceding evolutionary and physiological evidence for dimension reduc-
tion, it is possible that non-human animals are capable of using such a mechanism.
Herrnstein and Loveland (1964) originally thought they had trained pigeons to use
some pre-existing category of “people” in order to discriminate photographs, but
Greene (1983) contradicted their claim by training pigeons to discriminate between
Herrnstein and Loveland’s stimuli after the people in the photographs had been re-
moved. The pigeons responded to Greene’s photographs just as they had to the
originals. Therefore, there may have been a general style to the people photographs
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that the pigeons could respond to in order to perform the discrimination task; that is,
there may be some features in the photographs that occur as a result of the constraints
of taking a photograph with people in it.
Although pigeons have a visual acuity comparable to humans, they do not auto-
matically perform the same in certain visual tasks. People can easily understand the
concepts of “greater than” and “equal to”, but pigeons do not seem able to do so
(Pearce, 1988). However, pigeons can easily discriminate between “small area” and
“large area”, although such a task is much more difficult for people to do. Pearce
(1988) theorised that the reason for such a discrepancy is that the rules that gov-
ern “small area” and “large area” are not easily verbalised. It seems that because
the pigeons were not attempting to find any relationships or rules that defined the
categories, they were able to do the task.
If pigeons are capable of performing discrimination tasks without regard to possi-
ble rules or labels to stimuli, then it is possible that humans can do so as well—under
certain conditions. In one sense, the propensity to look for rules and justifications
may be deemed a secondary mechanism in that it must serve some sort of advantage
(otherwise it would not exist), but it is obviously not necessary. It is not the case that
pigeons should be considered less intelligent; as described in Chapter 1, they are quite
capable of making rather sophisticated judgements. In order to “turn people into pi-
geons”, it appears necessary to use stimuli with restrained verbalisable content—and
dimension reduction does just that.
2.6 Human Animals and Processing Strategies
Traditionally, implicit learning has been described as an automatic process that is
outside of conscious control (e.g., Reber, 1967). Instances of separate automatic and
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controlled systems can be seen in ubiquitous descriptions of conscious versus uncon-
scious memory. However, it has been demonstrated through the use of opposition
logic that what appears as different memory systems are actually deliberate appli-
cations of different strategies (Higham, Vokey, & Pritchard, 2000; Higham & Vokey,
2000).
A human participant, then, is capable of deliberately applying a particular strat-
egy when performing a judgement task. The unintended discriminative effects of a
strategy are the sources of different influences. It is these influences on behaviour that
can be either controlled or automatic. Control over humans’ processing of stimuli is
therefore achieved by manipulating what strategy is used.
There is no reason to suspect that the capacity to judge stimuli based on family
resemblance has been lost in humans. However it has been notoriously difficult to
demonstrate that such a capacity exists, as participants who are brought into the
lab for experiments adopt an “analytic” strategy; that is, they actively search for a
specific attribute or rule that defines one category relative to another. As analysis
depends on verbalisable features upon which to base rules, non-linguistic animals are
therefore not capable of it. Some examples of such tasks that require analysis are
distinguishing inside vs. outside (Herrnstein, Vaughan, Mumford, & Kosslyn, 1989)
and whether two vertical bars stand at equal or unequal heights (Pearce, 1988). By
employing an analytic strategy, however, human participants can perform the tasks
very easily.
The alternative strategy is what Brooks (1978) has described as nonanalytic cog-
nition, which involves the memory for individual cases. It is nonanalysis that follows
the exemplar model of judgements of style by gaining information from individual
examples. That is, by processing stimuli nonanalytically, humans might judge stim-
uli based on family resemblance (e.g., a painting is thought to be by an Impressionist
18
because it is in the overall style of Impressionism).
Brooks successfully diverted participants’ analysis of stimuli by having them focus
on the use of the stimuli rather than on the way they are defined. In such a way,
classification becomes an incidental part of the task (e.g., Brooks et al., 2007; Whit-
tlesea & Price, 2001). In using human participants, it seems it may be necessary to
prevent their approaching the experimental stimuli with an analytic strategy in order
to demonstrate stimulus judgements based on exemplars.
2.7 The Current Experiments
Images that have undergone dimension reduction provide for stimuli that are unlikely
to possess human-nameable structural regularities or features. By making stimulus
definition an incidental part of the task, we hope to elicit a nonanalytic strategy
for processing stimuli. By doing so, it may be possible to demonstrate that human
participants are able to pick up the information remaining in partially reconstructed
images in order to perform an indirect discrimination.
One main goal of the following experiments is to determine whether humans can
judge complex categories of images that are only comprised of their primary visual
dimensions. Judgements of style above chance should provide evidence that human
beings may be “turned into pigeons” in the sense that they would be indirectly dis-
criminating stimuli in the same manner that has been demonstrated in pigeons.
Subsequent experiments also seek to demonstrate not only that humans are ca-
pable of making judgements based on family resemblance, but that they can do so
undirected. Showing undirected use of a nonanalytic strategy may have implications
for humans’ ubiquitous use of nonanalysis in everyday matters, and will help to under-
stand the conditions that elicit different processing strategies; as well the relationship
19
between the visual system of humans and non-human visual systems may be better
understood.
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Chapter 3
Experiment 1: Stopping the Analytic Strategy
Given that pigeons are capable of indirectly discriminating between images containing
people from those that do not—even when each the information in each image has
been rearranged (Aust & Huber, 2001) or flipped (Greene, 1983)—there should be
enough redundant visual information across the images within a category to make
a categorical judgement. Likewise, pigeons’ sensitivity to the seemingly complex
nature of artistic style (e.g., Watanabe et al., 1995) demonstrates that there is enough
information within a Monet painting for the pigeon to determine that it is not a
Picasso, regardless of the fact that both of the artists painted various scenes, people,
and objects.
The learning of complex, polymorphous stimuli exhibited by pigeons may be
present as a mechanism within the human capacity for visual processing as well.
However, demonstrating such a capacity with human participants in a laboratory
setting has been notoriously difficult (Gross & Vokey, 2009). Humans seem unique
from other animals in that they possess two different strategies for processing stimuli.
An analytic strategy attempts to apply or generate a rule to determine category in-
clusiveness, whereas a nonanalytic strategy denotes a focus on memory for individual
cases (Brooks, 1978). Particularly in an experimental setting, humans have a strong
tendency to go analytic in their processing of stimuli (e.g., Gross & Vokey, 2009).
In order to demonstrate the human capacity for non-analysis, it may be an im-
portant step to construct experimental conditions that prevent participants from
employing an analytic strategy. Brooks et al. (2007) successfully diverted analysis by
providing a distractor task that required the use of a rule-finding strategy. To show
that judgements of style can be made absent from verbalizable content, stimuli were
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used that are likely devoid of any capacity to have semantic, rule-based attributes
applied to them.
3.1 Method
3.1.1 Participants
Twenty-eight undergraduate students from the University of Lethbridge were re-
cruited from the psychology undergraduate student participant pool, and received
course credit in either a first or second year psychology course for their participation.
All participants were na¨ıve as to the true intention of the experiment, and instructions
were given both verbally and by accompanying text on the computer screen.
3.1.2 Design
The 320 standard-sized images of Monet and Picasso paintings were deconstructed
and partially reconstructed using a weighted, linear combination of their first 20
eigenvectors. The first 20 were used because, as shown in Figures 2.1 and 2.2, the
first 20 eigenvectors should contain the most covariant, category-relevant information
before many easily-nameable features of the original image—such as distinct objects
and lines—begin to show up.
Using the leave-one-out technique, the 16 “best” Monet and Picasso images (i.e.,
those that are best representative of their respective spaces) were chosen. The 16
most similar images (i.e., the best matches to the best Monet and Picasso images)
and the 16 least similar images (i.e., the worst matches to the best Monet and Picasso
images) to the projection of each of the best Monet and Picasso images were selected,
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producing conditions of test stimuli conceptually similar to the “near” and “far”
stimuli of Vokey and Brooks (1992).
3.1.3 Procedure
The experiment consisted of two conditions (one for being shown Picasso images
during training and the other for being shown Monet images), each with a training and
test phase. During the training phase, the “best” items of the condition’s category
were shown. Each “best” image was paired with the name of a Canadian city, as
participants were informed at the start of the experiment that they were to memorize
the pairing of each name with each image for a subsequent test of memory. The
pairing of images with words served as a diversion to the processing of the style of the
images (e.g., Brooks, 1978). Each image and word pair was serially presented 4 times
for 3 seconds each for a total of 64 paired stimuli. The reconstructed images did not
seem at a glance to actually be pictures in themselves; rather, they were introduced
to participants as “image cards”.
During the test phase, the reconstructed “best”, “best match”, and “worst match”
images of both categories were shown. Participants were tested for their recognition
of the Monet and Picasso 20-eigenvector images using a scale of 1 to 12 (1 being
“Sure New” and 12 being “Sure Old”). If the participants retained a memory for the
style of the images presented during the training phase, then they should show an
effect of recognition for the new test images that are more representative of the space
projected for whichever artist’s images were used during training (i.e., their “best
matches”).
Following completion of the experiment, the participants were then instructed to
fill out a short, hand-written survey. It consisted of two question: “What did you
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Table 3.1: Mean Hit and False-positive Rates As a Function of Training Category
(Same vs. Different) and Test Item Type in Experiment 1
Best Best Match Worst Match
Same Category 0.74 0.59 0.13
Different Category 0.56 0.48 0.12
use to remember the images?” and “What did you use to reject the images?”. Upon
completion of the survey, participants were debriefed and free to leave.
3.2 Results and Discussion
Shown in Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1 are the mean hit and false-positive rates (scale-
responses >6) as a function of training category (same vs. different) and test item-
type, collapsed over training category (Monet vs. Picasso). Items from the same cate-
gory as training were identified as “old” (M = .49) significantly more frequently than
were items from the different category (M = .38), F (1, 27) = 18.14;MSE = .023, p =
.0002. There was also a significant main effect of test item type: best items (M = .63)
were labelled as “old” more often than best match items (M = .54) and worst match
items (M = .12), F (2, 54) = 194.05;MSE = .022; p < .0001. Test item type inter-
acted significantly with training category, F (2, 54) = 9.08;MSE = .011; p = .0004.
Planned comparisons of the interaction showed that old (same category) best items
were labelled as “old” more frequently than new (different category) best items
[t(1, 27) = 4.45, p = .0001], false-positive responses to same category best match
items were significantly higher than false-positive responses to different category best
match items [t(1, 27) = 3.0830, p = .0047], but there was no significant difference in
false-positive responses between same category and different category worst match
items [t(1, 27) = .5419, p = .5924].
Figure 3.2 depicts the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves fitted to the
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mean cumulative hit and false-positive rates at each level of confidence to each of the
three item type conditions (best, best match, and worst match) for the discrimination
of the category of the images. ROC curves plot the unit square of paired hit (same
category items) and false-positive (different category items) rates for different crite-
rion settings of the willingness to label an image as one encountered at study. They
were derived for each participant (and then averaged) based on the confidence levels
assigned to each response (see, e.g., Wickens, 2001). The fitted curves were computed
via a web-based program (see Eng, n.d.) assuming equal-variance Gaussian distribu-
tions. It is evident from Figure 3.2 that participants in Experiment 1 discriminated
best items better than best match items, which, in turn, were better discriminated
than worst match items.
This impression was confirmed by an analysis of the area under the ROC curves
(AUC) for the three test item types. These AUC statistics were computed for each
participant from their 12-point confidence ratings using the equivalent of the trape-
zoidal rule, the Wilcoxon (or Mann–Whitney) statistic, W , using the Hanley and
McNeil (1982) algorithm. Values of AUC typically vary between .50 (chance dis-
crimination) and 1.0 (perfect discrimination) and, accordingly, index discrimination
between targets and distractors independent of decision criterion. These AUC values
were subjected to a one-way (item type), within-subjects ANOVA, with participants
crossing the factor as the random variate. There was a significant difference among
the three conditions, F (2, 81) = 11.2;MSE = 0.0123; p < 0.0001.
The mean AUC of the best, [t(1, 27) = 5.11, p < .0001], and the best-match,
[t(1, 27) = 3.60, p = .001] conditions were both significantly greater than chance, but
the worst match was not, [t(1, 27) = 0.1441, p = .8844]. Best was significantly greater
than best match, [t(1, 27) = 2.78, p=. 28], and best match was significantly greater
than worst match, [t(1, 27) = 3.82, p= 0.001].
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Thus, as with the pigeon studies, participants in Experiment 1 showed some ability
to recognize old (i.e., training) items, and some ability to generalise what they had
learned of the category to new, highly similar to training, best match items, but not
to new, not similar to training, worst match items.
3.2.1 Participants’ Spontaneous Utterances and
Descriptions
At the onset of the test phase, many participants expressed surprise at being suddenly
confronted with the task of deciding whether they had seen the images before. Some
of them protested, insisting that there must be more to what they had to do. After
all, they had just spent significant effort trying to remember which of the images
had been paired with which city name. Similar to Brooks’ (1978) participants, they
were generally hesitant and not confident that they could correctly perform the task.
Many of the participants offered unsolicited guesses as to what the images that they
were working with were. Many thought they were looking at streaks or splotches of
paint, and several wondered whether they were optical illusions.
Regarding the results of the survey that was completed by each participant at
the end of the experiment, the majority of the participants cited general patterns,
shapes, and textures as their reasons for remembering and rejecting images. One
person specifically stated remembering images based on seeing specific items such as
a bottle. Two participants stated that they based their judgements on whether or
not the images were familiar to them. The remaining few responses included criteria
such as shadows, colour, and brightness.
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3.3 Experimental Shortcoming: Too Much Infor-
mation Remaining in the Images
Given the reports from some participants that they thought they were basing their
recognition on objects or features that they thought they could make out, it is possible
some high-level information was still present in images constructed from their first 20
eigenvectors. As such, some participants may have been focusing on specific details of
images rather than their overall style and inadvertently discriminating the categories
on that basis. If we removed this information and participants still selected more
same category best match items than different category best match images as old,
such results would provide stronger evidence for judgements based on style. The next
experiment did just that.
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Chapter 4
Experiment 2: Reducing the Available
Information to Just the First Ten Eigenvectors
The prior experiment provided evidence that human participants are capable of judg-
ing stimuli based on the information available across a set of partially reconstructed
images. Furthermore, the first 20 eigenvectors contain enough information of the orig-
inal images to do so. However, many participants reported that they were still able
to discern some verbalizable detail from the images, which raises some question as to
whether they were basing their judgements on the style of stimuli or on particular
human-nameable features. The second experiment attempted to replicate the results
of Experiment 1, but with using stimuli containing even less information.
As shown in Figure 2.3, the performance of a neural network in the same sort of
discrimination task for reconstructed images tends to asymptote around the 8th to
10th eigenvector (depending on the images). Therefore, the information remaining in
images reconstructed with those eigenvectors does contain the information necessary
for the neural network to perform the task at above chance levels. If a neural network
is a proper model for human judgement of visual stimuli, then those first 10 eigen-
vectors should hold the information necessary for human participants to perform the
task as well.
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4.1 Method
4.1.1 Participants
Sixteen undergraduate students from the University of Lethbridge were recruited from
the psychology undergraduate student participant pool, and received course credit in
either a first or second year psychology course for their participation. All participants
were na¨ıve as to the true intention of the experiment, and instructions were given both
verbally and by accompanying text on the computer screen.
4.1.2 Design
Creation of the 320 images was the same as in Experiment 1, except that each of
the images was reconstructed using a weighted, linear combination of only the first
10 eigenvectors, rather than the first 20 eignvectors as in Experiment 1. Using the
leave-one-out technique, each image was projected into the space defined by all the
remaining 159 images of a given category and the 16 best (i.e., highest reconstruction
cosines) were chosen for each category. The 16 best matches and the 16 worst matches
to the projection of each the best Monet and Picasso images were then selected.
4.1.3 Procedure
As in Experiment 1, this experiment consisted of a training phase and a test phase.
Participants were informed at the start of the experiment that they were to memorise
the pairing of the name of a Canadian city with each “image card” for a subsequent
test of memory, and were evenly divided between the Monet and Picasso conditions.
During the training phase, the best images from a condition’s category were shown.
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Table 4.1: Mean Hit and False-positive Rates As a Function of Training Category
(Same vs. Different) and Test Item Type in Experiment 2.
Best Best Match Worst Match
Same Category 0.72 0.69 0.34
Different Category 0.50 0.55 0.30
Each image and word pair was serially presented 4 times for 3 seconds each for a total
of 64 paired stimuli.
Again as in Experiment 1, during the test phase, the best images from training,
their best matches, and their worst match were randomly shown. Participants were
tested for their recognition of the reconstructed images using a scale of 1 to 12 (1
being “Sure New” and 12 being “Sure Old”). If participants are capable of indirectly
discriminating the images of paintings based on information contained within only
the first 10 eigenvectors, then they should identify the same category best match
items as old more frequently than the different category best match items.
Also as in Experiment 1, following the completion of the test phase, participants
were asked to complete a short survey regarding their criteria for remembering and
rejecting the images. They were then debriefed and free to leave.
4.2 Results and Discussion
Shown in Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1 are the mean hit and false-positive rates (scale-
responses > 6) as a function of training category (same vs. different) and test item-
type, collapsed over training category (Monet vs. Picasso). Items from the same
category as training were identified as “old” (M = .57) significantly more frequently
than were items from the different category (M = .45), F (1, 15) = 17.08;MSE =
.022, p = .0009. There was also a significant main effect of test item type: best
items (M = .61) were labelled as “old” more often than best match items (M = .62)
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and worst match items (M = .30), F (2, 30) = 14.98;MSE = .069; p < .0001. Test
item type interacted significantly with training category, F (2, 30) = 4.70;MSE =
.017; p = .02. As in Experiment 1, planned comparisons of the interaction showed
that old (same category) best items were labelled as “old” more frequently than new
(different category) best items [t(1, 15) = 4.44, p = .0005], false-positive responses to
same category best match items were significantly higher than false-positive responses
to different category best match items [t(1, 15) = 3.25, p = .005], but there was no
significant difference in false-positive responses between same category and different
category worst match items [t(1, 15) = .90, p = .38]. Thus, as with the pigeon studies
and the results of Experiment 1, participants in Experiment 2 showed some ability
to recognize old (i.e., training) items, and some ability to generalise what they had
learned of the category to new, highly similar to training, best match items, but not
to new, not similar to training, worst match items.
As in Experiment 1, Figure 4.2 depicts the receiver operating characteristic (ROC)
curves fitted to the mean cumulative hit and false-positive rates at each level of
confidence to each of the three item type conditions (best, best match, and worst
match) for the indirect discrimination of the category of the images. Compared with
the same curves from Experiment 1, although the category of the best items appears
to be relatively well-judged, it is less clear that the same was true for the best match
and worst match items. This impression was confirmed by an analysis of the area
under the ROC curves (AUC) for the three test item types. These AUC values
were subjected to a one-way (item type), within-subjects ANOVA, with participants
crossing the factor as the random variate. As in Experiment 1, there was a significant
difference among the three conditions, F (2, 45) = 5.35;MSE = 0.0129; p = 0.008,
with the mean AUC of the best, [t(1, 15) = 5.63, p < .0001], and the best-match,
[t(1, 15) = 2.40, p = .025] conditions both significantly greater than chance, but the
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worst match was not, [t(1, 15) = .9440, p = .3450]. Best was significantly greater than
best match, [t(1, 15) = 3.45, p = 0.001], but, unlike the results of Experiment 1, best
match was not significantly greater than worst match, [t(1, 15) = 0.8385, p = 0.45].
Still, for the most part the results of Experiment 2 replicate those of Experiment 1,
even though the images were constructed from just the first 10 eigenvectors.
The results of both experiments bode well for neural networks and their attempted
modeling of human visual discrimination. Just as the network can learn from images
with most of the information removed, so apparently can humans. As well, the results
indicate that judgements of style—normally considered to be quite a sophisticated
skill—may actually be a lot simpler.
4.2.1 Participants’ Spontaneous Utterances and
Descriptions
Unlike the results of Experiment 1, none of the participants in this experiment cited
seeing specific shapes as their reason for remembering the images. Instead, virtually
all of them gave specific descriptions of colour (such as boldness, variation, and hue)
as at least part of their reasons for their judgements. Five of the participants de-
scribed their judgements as coming from feelings of familiarity or unfamiliarity with
the images. Several complained that the task was too difficult, and one specifically
claimed to have relied on “gut feelings”. Thus, we appear to have accomplished our
goal: successful judgements of style in the absence of nameable features.
37
4.3 Experimental Shortcoming: May Be Either Ex-
emplars or Prototype
The results of Experiment 2 demonstrate how little visual information is apparently
needed in order to make categorically–consistent judgements about Monet and Picasso
images. As well, it provides some evidence for the neural network as a plausible
model of some visual processing. However, the results do not yet describe whether
participants’ structural learning is in the form of individual exemplars or prototypes.
The prototype view of categorization describes individuals as forming an ideal or
average prototype of a category as they come across individual members (e.g., Rosch,
1973, 1975). For the category of “bird”, for example, individuals would have formed
a prototypical perfect or average bird that is most representative of that category.
Judgements about other stimuli would then be based on comparing them to that
prototype. Given that the participants in both Experiments 1 and 2 were given the
best examples of their training category, it is possible that they simply formed a
prototype and made their recognition judgements relative to it, rather than make
judgements based on family resemblance and studied instances. The next experiment
was an attempt to investigate that issue.
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Chapter 5
Experiment 3: Disrupting the Formation of a
Prototype: Random Selection During Training
The results of Experiments 1 and 2 have successfully demonstrated that human partic-
ipants are capable of picking up the remaining information in partially reconstructed
images. By using a distraction task, such as having to remember which image is
paired with which Canadian city name, learning the structure of the images becomes
incidental to the main task, and participants’ tendency to search for a rule that gov-
erns category definition can be diverted. This task can be accomplished when the
images have been partially reconstructed using their first 20 eigenvectors—roughly
the maximum amount of eigenvectors that can be used for reconstruction before ver-
balizable aspects of the images (e.g., shapes and lines) seem noticeable—and when the
reconstruction uses only the first 10 eigenvectors—around the same number needed
for asymptotic performance of a neural network.
However, results so far fail to show whether human participants are making judge-
ments of style based on memory for individual instances or on the formation of a
prototype. For each condition, the stimuli selected for the training portion of the ex-
periment were the “best” Monet and Picasso paintings, as these give the participants
the best impression of the artists’ styles. That is, the “best” images are the ones that
share the most characteristics with the other images of their category. In terms of
the family resemblance continuum, they are the ones with many connections with the
other images. In terms of a prototype, they are the ones that are clustered closest
around it. In either case, they are, for example, the robins of the “bird” category
rather than the ostriches, as robins are closer to an ideal or average bird.
Using the best Monet and Picasso images makes it difficult to determine whether
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participants are learning from these excellent examples, or whether they could be
abstracting a prototype that the images are gathering around. In the current ex-
periment, it is necessary to introduce particular circumstances where drawing on
exemplars would generate better performance in judging stimuli than would drawing
on a prototype (e.g., Whittlesea, 1987).
5.1 Method
5.1.1 Participants
Sixteen undergraduate students from the University of Lethbridge were recruited from
the psychology undergraduate student participant pool, and received course credit in
either a first or second year psychology course for their participation. All participants
were na¨ıve as to the true intention of the experiment, and instructions were given both
verbally and by accompanying text on the computer screen.
5.1.2 Design
The images used in this experiment are the same ones that underwent dimension
reduction and partial reconstruction. As the prior experiment demonstrated that only
the information present within the first 10 eigenvectors is necessary for discrimination,
that is the extent to which the current images were reconstructed.
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5.1.3 Procedure
Once again, participants were equally divided between Monet and Picasso conditions,
each with a training and test phase. During the training phase, randomly-selected
images from that condition’s category were shown. By using random images from an
artist category rather than the “best” images, there should be, at best, loose clustering
of the selected images around a possible prototype. The “image cards” were again
paired with names of Canadian cities as a diversion to the processing of the style of
the images (Brooks, 1978). Each image and word pair was serially presented 4 times
for 3 seconds each for a total of 64 paired stimuli.
During the test phase, the randomly-selected training images, the best matches
to those images, and another set of randomly-selected images of both categories were
shown. Participants were tested for their recognition of the reconstructed images using
a scale of 1 to 12 (1 being “Sure New” and 12 being “Sure Old”). If the participants
were basing their judgements on memory for instances, then those judgements would
be based on the randomly-selected training items rather than a prototype for the
category that is formed from them. As such, they should perform better at the best
matches to the randomly selected training items than to randomly selected images
from that category.
When the experiment was finished, participants were asked to fill out a short
survey regarding their reasons for deciding whether images were new or old, and were
debriefed about the true intentions of the experiment. They were then free to leave.
5.2 Results and Discussion
Shown in Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1 are the mean hit and false-positive rates (scale-
responses > 6) as a function of training category (same vs. different) and test item-
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Table 5.1: Mean Hit and False-positive Rates As a Function of Training Category
(Same vs. Different) and Test Item Type in Experiment 3
Random Train Best Match Random
Category 0.61 0.59 0.40
Non-Category 0.42 0.39 0.34
type, collapsed over training category (Monet vs. Picasso). Items from the same
category as training were identified as “old” (M = .53) significantly more frequently
than were items from the different category (M = .38), F (1, 15) = 15.19;MSE =
0.0354, p = 0.001. There was also a significant main effect of test item type: random
training items (M = .52) were labelled as “old” more often than best match items
(M = .49) and random items (M = .37), F (2, 30) = 11.89;MSE = 0.0166; p =
0.0002. However, unlike the previous experiments, test item type did not interact
significantly with training category, F (2, 30) = 2.63;MSE = .0175; p = .09. Despite
that, and similar to the results of the the previous experiments, planned comparisons
of the interaction showed that old (same category) random training items were la-
belled as “old” more frequently than new (different category) random training items
[t(1, 15) = 4.11, p = .0009], false-positive responses to same category best match
items were significantly higher than false-positive responses to different category best
match items [t(1, 15) = 3.23, p = .006], but there was no significant difference in
false-positive responses between same category and different category random items
[t(1, 15) = 1.16, p = .26]. Thus, as with the pigeon studies and Experiments 1 and
2, participants in Experiment 3 showed some ability to recognize old (i.e., training)
items, and some ability to generalise what they had learned of the category to new,
highly similar to training, best match items, but not to new, not similar to training,
random items.
As with Experiments 1 and 2, Figure 5.2 depicts the receiver operating charac-
teristic (ROC) curves fitted to the mean cumulative hit and false-positive rates at
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each level of confidence to each of the three item type conditions (random train, best
match, and random) for the judgement of the style of the images. Unlike the previous
experiments, there appears to be little to be gained from the ROC analyses, perhaps
because the overall levels of indirect categorisation were quite low.
This impression was confirmed by an analysis of the area under the ROC curves
(AUC) for the three test item types. As in Experiments 1 and 2, The AUC values
were subjected to a one-way (item type), within-subjects ANOVA, with participants
crossing the factor as the random variate. Unlike the previous experiments, there
was no significant difference among the three conditions, F (2, 45) = 2.04;MSE =
0.0180; p = 0.142. However, the mean AUC of the random training, [t(1, 15) =
3.83, p = .001], and the best-match, [t(1, 15) = 3.14, p = 0.0055] conditions were both
significantly greater than chance, but the random test was not, [t(1, 15) = 1.15, p =
.2528]. Also unlike the previous experiments, random train was not significantly
greater than best match, [t(1, 15) = 0.3936, p = 0.64], nor was best match significantly
greater than random test, [t(1, 15) = 0.0047, p = 0.15].
As with the pigeon studies and Experiments 1 and 2, participants in Experiment
3 showed some ability to recognise old (i.e., training) items, and some ability to
generalise what they had learned of the category to new, highly similar to training,
best match items, but not to new, not similar to training, random items.
Because the training items were selected at random from each category, it is less
likely that participants would form a prototype of the training category (or they
would form a prototype that was noisier). But even if they had done so, it should
apply equally to the best match items as to the random test items. Yet only on the
best match items did the participants show significant indirect categorisation. Thus,
these results do not seem to support what one would expect from the abstraction
of category prototypes as much as they are consistent with a simple nonanalytic,
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instance-based memory for the source of the effects of category structure.
5.2.1 Participants’ Spontaneous Utterances and
Descriptions
Five of the participants claimed to be basing their judgements on feelings of famil-
iarity or lack thereof. Several of them described specified strategies that they used
to remember the pairings of each image with its city name, such as Nanaimo being
blue because it has lots of water and Vancouver being grayish because it is frequently
cloudy. One person tried to pair city sport team colours with the colours of the image.
Several cited specific aspects of colour, such as “extremeness”, and one person com-
plained of not knowing beforehand how difficult the memory task would be without
the city names paired with the images.
5.3 Experimental Shortcoming: Only Inducement
Has Been Demonstrated Thus Far
The prior experiments have provided evidence that not only can human participants
make categorically-consistent judgements based on what little information remains
in images that have been reconstructed with only their first 10 eigenvectors, but also
that they seem to do so by learning from individual examples of a category more
likely than by forming a prototype. However, the preceding experiments only go so
far as to demonstrate evidence under strict laboratory conditions. They cannot speak
to whether humans can base their judgements on instances in everyday, undirected
life. The following experiments attempted to address that issue, and are intended to
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help begin the generalisation of results to circumstances outside the laboratory.
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Chapter 6
Experiment 4: Testing Undirected Sorting Based
On Similarity to Instances Using the First Ten
Eigenvectors
Prior experiments have provided evidence that humans are capable of making dis-
criminations based on judgements of style when placed under very specific laboratory
conditions. The current experiment sought to demonstrate that human participants
could still make such judgements when experimental conditions were less restricted.
The procedure subsequently described was an attempt to make a small step towards
mimicking conditions of the real world. Participants were not specifically directed to
use nonanalysis like in the prior experiments, but a sorting task still maintains much
of the same properties. Particularly because participants were still able to see images
after they had made their judgements on them, it was still very much a matching
task.
6.1 Method
6.1.1 Participants
Twenty-four undergraduate students from the University of Lethbridge were recruited
from the psychology undergraduate student participant pool, and received course
credit in either a first or second year psychology course for their participation. All
participants were na¨ıve as to the true intention of the experiment, and instructions
were given both verbally and by accompanying text on the computer screen.
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6.1.2 Design
The same 160 Picasso and 160 Monet images from Experiments 2 and 3 were used as
stimuli for this experiment. The images were partially reconstructed with the first 10
eigenvectors. As demonstrated in prior experiments, the first 10 eigenvectors contain
enough information for a judgement above chance. The 320 images were randomly
shuﬄed into a single virtual stack for each participant.
6.1.3 Procedure
Participants were informed that they would be performing a card sorting task, and
were seated in front of a vertically bisected computer screen. At the bottom of the
centre of the screen sat a randomly shuﬄed pile of “image cards”. Participants were
instructed to sort the pile of images by clicking on and dragging them to either side
of the vertical line, forming two separate piles. They were specifically informed that
they could use whatever criteria they wanted in order to decide which image belonged
in which pile, and could change their minds and rearrange the cards as they wished
at any time. At the top centre of the screen was a button labeled “Clean Up” for
de-cluttering the two piles that the participants were free to use if they wanted their
piles of images to be better organised. Cleaning up the screen only caused the already-
sorted images to cluster closer together into their separate piles; it did not change
which side of the screen the images had been placed. Once the entire image card
pile had been sorted, a “Done” button under the pile could be clicked to end the
experiment when the participants were satisfied with how they had sorted the cards.
The task was not timed.
Upon confirming that they were finished sorting the cards, each participant was
presented with a short survey that inquired about their basis for sorting the cards into
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the two piles. When finished, participants were free to leave, and they were debriefed
about the true intentions of the experiment if they expressed interest.
6.2 Results and Discussion
As the participants did not label their two piles as “Monet” and “Picasso”, we des-
ignated the pile with the largest proportion of Monet images as the “Monet” pile
for scoring, and the other pile was designated the “Picasso” pile. Therefore, the hit
rate was obtained by dividing the number of Monet images placed in the “Monet”
pile by the total number of Monet images (i.e., the proportion of Monet images that
were correctly sorted). The false alarm rate was calculated by dividing the number
of Picasso images in the same pile by the total number of Picasso images (i.e., the
proportion of Picasso images incorrectly labeled as Monet images).
6.2.1 Estimation of Procedural Response Bias
Due to the scoring procedure, the hit-rate is necessarily biased to be greater than
the false-alarm rate, even if participants were sorting the image cards entirely at
random with respect to our Monet and Picasso distinction. To estimate the degree
of that bias, and to produce a randomisation distribution with which to compare the
results of the experiment, the experiment was simulated 10,000 times. For each of the
10,000 simulated experiments, 24 simulated participants (to match the experimental
conditions) were run.
The simulated participants each produced “Pile 1” and “Pile 2” responses drawn
from a random uniform distribution containing the equal numbers of the values “1”
and “2” for each of the 320 images. The simulated data were then scored in the
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same manner as described for the actual participants, creating simulated hit and
false-positive rates. The simulated results for each simulated participant were then
converted into their associated A′ values to provide a measure of the degree to which
our procedure for scoring could produce apparent discrimination of the two Monet
and Picasso categories in the absence of any real discrimination. For each of the 24
simulated participants, the simulated A′ values were averaged and recorded to create
a sampling distribution of mean A′ values for the 10,000 simulated experiments. The
simulated sampling distribution is shown in Figure 6.1.
The 24 real participants who were given the task of sorting a stack of image cards
into two separate piles on the computer screen did so with a mean hit rate of 0.53,
a mean false-positive rate of 0.39, and A′ of 0.62, exceeding even the highest A′
of the simulated sampling distribution of such values (p < 0.0001), indicating that
they were indirectly discriminating the two categories of images at a level well above
chance. Thus, even though they could use any criteria at all for sorting the items, the
participants still sorted the items along the lines of the Monet and Picasso distinction
of the original images.
6.3 Participants’ Spontaneous Utterances and De-
scriptions
It is interesting to note that, upon being given the instructions for the experiment
and finally seeing the stack of images to be sorted, many participants responded with
unease and uncertainty about the task. Even after being told that they could use
whatever criteria they wanted in deciding which of the two piles each card should
go, several individuals still asked what criteria the experimenter wanted them to use.
Such questions, of course, were met with the assurance that they could use whatever
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they wanted. Several of the participants sought to confirm what they were expected
to do by asking whether the stack of image cards would flip around so that the image
would be visible once they clicked on the card. They were surprised and seemed a bit
confused that what they thought was the nondescript backside of a card was actually
the image on the card itself.
During the experiment, many participants chose to leave the image cards spread
out, and rarely cleaned up their two piles. They spent quite some time in sorting,
often mulling over their decisions and hesitating.
Of the 24 participants who were given this sorting task, 18 of them reported in the
post-experiment survey that they had based their decisions on colour. Given that the
mean performance A′ = 0.62 is almost identical to that of the perceptron classifier
applied directly to the pixel-maps in Chapter 2, this result suggests that sorting by
colour might be a the basis for the sorting of the two categories. However, none of
the ten eigenvectors used to reconstruct the stimuli is primarily correlated with a
simple colour distinction, so despite its popularity as a cited basis, it is unlikely to
be a plausible explanation. The remaining responses included such things as whether
an image looked “worn like an old couch”, whether the image was more transparent
vs. more abstract, and whether the image had texture.
6.4 Experimental Shortcoming: Further Evidence
Needed for Generalising Results to the Natu-
ral World
Participants given unspecified criteria may make judgements based on style when the
stimuli are likely devoid of any human-nameable feature, but, of course, we do not
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experience stimuli in the real world that have undergone eigen-decomposition. The
next experiment sought to demonstrate whether participants continue to sort on the
basis of family resemblance, even when verbalisable image content is present. It was
intended as another—albeit small—step toward conditions in the real world.
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Chapter 7
Experiment 5: Testing Undirected Sorting Based
On Similarity to Instances Using the Full Images
The results of Experiments 1-4 have successfully provided some evidence that people
are capable of sorting Picasso and Monet images based on style both when placed
under specific laboratory conditions and also when conditions are less restricted. The
remaining question is whether people will continue to do so when the full image (that
is, all information—including human-nameable features) is presented.
7.1 Method
7.1.1 Participants
Twenty-four undergraduate students from the University of Lethbridge were recruited
from the psychology undergraduate student participant pool, and received course
credit in either a first or second year psychology course for their participation. All
participants were na¨ıve as to the true intention of the experiment, and instructions
were given both verbally and by accompanying text on the computer screen.
7.1.2 Design
160 Picasso and 160 Monet images were used as stimuli for the experiment. The
images used were the original ones of the actual paintings (i.e., fully constructed
with all eigenvectors) that had been the source of the eigen-reconstructed images in
Experiments 1-4. The 320 images were randomly shuﬄed into a single virtual stack
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for each participant.
7.1.3 Procedure
As in experiment 4, participants were informed that they would be performing a card
sorting task, and were seated in front of a vertically bisected computer screen. At
the bottom of the centre of the screen sat a randomly shuﬄed pile of “image cards”.
Participants were instructed to sort the pile of images by clicking on and dragging
them to either side of the vertical line, forming two separate piles. They could use
whatever criteria they wanted to decide which image belonged in which pile, and
could change their minds and rearrange the cards as they wished at any time. At the
top centre of the screen was the “Clean Up” button for de-cluttering the two piles
that the participants were free to use. Once the entire pile of image cards had been
moved, a “Done” button under the pile could be clicked to end the experiment if the
participants were satisfied with their sorting. The task was not timed.
Participants were required to fill out a short survey regarding their criteria for
sorting the images into the two piles at the end of the experiment.
7.2 Results and Discussion
Once again, as the participants did not label their two piles as “Monet” and “Picasso”
(or as anything else), we designated the pile with the largest proportion of Monet
images as the “Monet” pile for scoring, and the remaining pile as the ”Picasso” pile.
The hit rate was the proportion of Monet images that were correctly sorted, and the
false alarm rate was the proportion of Picasso images incorrectly labeled.
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7.2.1 Estimation of Procedural Response Bias
Identically to experiment 4, the scoring procedure results in the hit-rate being biased
to exceed the false-alarm rate—even if participants were sorting the image cards
entirely at random with respect to our Monet and Picasso distinction. The results of
this experiment were compared to the sampling distribution, shown in Figure 6.1. For
each of the 24 simulated participants, their simulated A’ values were averaged and
recorded to create a sampling distribution of mean A’ values for the 10,000 simulated
experiments.
The 24 real participants who were given the task of sorting a stack of image cards
into two separate piles on the computer screen did so with a mean hit rate of 0.86,
a mean false-positive rate of 0.19, and A′ = 0.87, exceeding the the highest value of
the simulated sampling distribution (p < 0.0001), and indicating sorting of the two
categories at a level substantially above chance.
7.2.2 Participants’ Descriptions
Unlike the prior experiments, many of the participants seemed at ease with being
given this particular task. Several of them confirmed the instructions of using what-
ever criteria they wished to sort the images into two piles by asking, “Whatever I
want, right?”. It is worth nothing that, unlike in Experiment 4, participants were
very quick to complete the task; they sorted the images with little to no hesitation.
18 of the 24 participants, when asked afterwards for their basis for sorting the
images into the two piles, specifically stated that they based their judgements on such
criteria as abstract vs. realism/Cubism vs. Impressionism/“artistic style”. Another
person specifically claimed, “I saw two different kinds of art”. Given these facts, it
appears likely that they generally sorted the image cards on the basis of covariation
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information shared across a category; that is, on the basis of style. The majority of
the remaining participants claimed to be sorting the images on the basis of colour
such as “dullness”, which—as already discussed—is unlikely to lead to as good of
individual performance as what they actually gave. The rest gave such reasons as
some pictures making them happy while others made them sad and whether or not
the images contained people.
7.3 Comparing Sorting of Reconstructed and Full
Images
Participants who were tasked with sorting partially reconstructed images and partic-
ipants who sorted full images both indirectly categorised Monet from Picasso images
significantly better than their simulated sampling distribution. In addition, a two-
sample randomisation test based on 10,000 random permutations using the R sta-
tistical computing language (R Core Team, 2013) and the “ez” package (Lawrence,
2013) demonstrates that the mean A′ value for participants who sorted full images
was significantly greater than the mean A′ value for those who sorted the partially
reconstructed images (p < 0.0001). The mean A′ value for the participants who dis-
criminated the full images was near perfect (over half of the participants scored an
A′ over 0.95).
Given the significant difference between the results of the two experiments, it is
obvious that more research is needed in order to determine the full basis for partici-
pants’ responses in Experiment 5. It is worth nothing, however, that nonanalysis can
work with nameable and non-nameable features. If, for example, participants were
placing an image containing a skull on the left because that pile already contained
images with skulls, that would still be nonanalysis because the judgement is based
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on individual examples.
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Chapter 8
General Discussion
The preceding experiments sought to demonstrate whether human participants are
capable of judging stimuli based on family resemblance between individual items.
Several important insights are provided from the experimental results.
In an attempt to determine the basis for the categorisation of visual stimuli by
human beings, images with limited verbalizable content were used in judgement tasks.
The first experiment used Monet and Picasso paintings that had been partially re-
constructed using only their first 20 eigenvectors. By diverting participants’ strong
tendency to search for verbalizable rules using a distraction task, it was demonstrated
both that there is enough information remaining the the first 20 eigenvectors for hu-
man participants to make the discrimination and that humans can be induced to use
a non-analytic strategy for processing stimuli. It is in this way that it seems people
can be “turned into pigeons”.
The second experiment followed the same methodology, but used as stimuli images
that had been partially reconstructed with only their first 10 eigenvectors. Despite
less information remaining in the images than in the first experiment, participants
were still able to indirectly discriminate Monet from Picasso paintings at levels above
chance, despite the apparent indistinctness of the images. The results provide evi-
dence as well for the neural network being a plausible model of human learning, as it
is at this level of image reconstruction that neural network discrimination asymptotes
in performance. Given that neural network asymptotic performance is better than
the mean human participant performance, further investigation is necessary in order
to determine whether, for example, human performance can be further improved, or
whether the neural network possesses a particular advantage over humans in this sort
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of task. The neural network was selected as a model to compare human performance
against due to the distribution of its nodes resembling the distribution of knowledge
believed to relate to family resemblance. It seems preferable for its simultaneity of
processing, as compared to a Von Neumann machine that processes information seri-
ally. The second experiment also shows that judgements of artistic style—something
normally considered to be a rather sophisticated skill—may actually be simpler than
originally thought.
The third experiment used randomly-selected members of each category during
training, so as to prevent participants from potentially forming a prototype of the
category they were trained on. Despite the further restriction in information, partic-
ipants were still able to indirectly categorise at levels above chance—as long as the
items are highly similar to the specific items they were trained with. The results show
that participants are possibly learning about and remembering stimuli on the basis
of memory of individual examples rather than from an abstracted prototype. Indeed,
what appears to be structural learning might actually be a memory for instances.
The fourth experiment provided evidence that, not only are participants capable
of making indirect categorical distinctions on the basis of family resemblance, but
also they can do so under less restricted conditions. The results have important
implications for how people might judge stimuli in a natural setting. That is, when
outside of the laboratory people might be using an nonanalytic strategy for much of
the time. It would be interesting to determine whether participants are speaking to
themselves as they mull over their responses to this sort of task.
The final experiment showed that participants can still use a nonanalytic strategy
when verbalizable content is present—attempting to mimic the stimuli in the natural
world. The results, however, seem to belie previous research demonstrating the diffi-
culty in depicting a nonanalytic strategy under laboratory conditions (e.g., Gross &
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Vokey, 2009). Further investigation is needed in order to determine why the task in
the final experiment seemed to work, but other methods, such as incorporating the
mere exposure effect, do not seem to demonstrate nonanalytic cognition.
Judgements of stimuli do not seem to be exclusively based on the specific objects
or nameable features that differ between them. Rather, the countless attributes of
stimuli that together look a certain way may be sufficient. It is this possibility that
likely makes the presumed bases of stimulus judgement difficult to articulate.
8.1 Corresponding Research: Wu et al., 2012
Wu, Tangen, Vokey, and Humphreys (2012) investigated whether human partici-
pants are sensitive to the stylistic differences constrained by the main target of a
photograph—similar to the stylistic constraints between painting styles imposed by
artists. They developed two sets of photographs, the first depicting either people or
objects that were definable on the basis of their intended targets (people or objects).
The second set was identical to the first except for the removal of the category-defining
target from each image. That is, that set was intended to be definable on the basis
of style.
The first experiment of Wu et al. (2012) was similar to that of Experiment 5 in
that participants were asked to sort a stack of complete images. Those who sorted
images containing the category-definable target tended to do so analytically; their
mean discrimination was near perfect, and the majority of participants explicitly
stated the person-target and object-target as their basis for discrimination. Those
who sorted the target-absent photographs, however, still showed evidence of sorting
on the basis of style. They showed significantly less discrimination (though still above
chance), and cited a variety of reasons for their sorting.
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Their second experiment was similar to Experiment 4; the target-present and
target-absent photographs were reconstructed with their first 10 eigenvectors, and
then used again in the same sorting task. Interestingly, reconstructed target-present
images look virtually the same as target-absent photographs, suggesting that the
covariation shared between individual photographs may not be dependent on the
target objects.
The mean A′ values for both the target-present and target-absent groups exceeded
a simulated sampling distribution similar to the one used in Experiments 4 and 5.
Unlike their first experiment, though, there was no significant difference between the
two groups. Just as in the current experiments, many of their participants cited colour
as the basis for discrimination. Wu et al. (2012), though, also performed a neural
network simulation of the categorization task when the linear classifier was applied
directly to the pixel maps, and showed that their photographs cannot be distinguished
on such bases of colour, brightness, or shading. When eigen-decomposition is included
in the simulated task, however, the neural network discriminates both the person-
target and object-target photographs well above chance, regardless of whether the
target is present. Thus, the results of Wu et al. (2012) provide corroborating evidence
that the stylistic information contained across the members of a category may be
sufficient for making a distinction, and that an analytic strategy can be diverted by
limiting human-nameable features.
8.2 Further Research
The results so far provide some evidence for a human capacity to make judgements
based on style. However, no firm conclusions regarding the precise mechanisms may
be drawn from them. The significant difference between the results of sorting par-
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tially reconstructed images compared to full ones, for example, provides evidence that
humans may be using human-nameable features at least some of the time. Sorting
full images into two piles—though an attempt to simulate undirected sorting in the
real world—is certainly only a small step towards doing so.
Further investigation should explore and seek to discover what circumstances are
necessary in order for people to employ a non-analytic strategy. In doing so, it could
perhaps be possible to gain some purchase on specifically controlling participants’
processing strategies. As well, it is necessary to continue studying the remaining
properties of partially reconstructed images. The information remaining within them
as well as any corollary to the natural world could provide insight into quotidian
visual and cognitive processing.
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